Futurology comprises the study of possible futures and, as such, it is a cheap thing: it does not require much to speculate about how things can be in the years to come. Futurology also produces inaccurate predictions most of the time, which could render this post useless. Nevertheless, here I am concerned with the future of philosophy of science. More precisely, I am interested in opening a discussion about the supposed tendency for philosophy of science to be more specialized, and their practitioners to undergo more training in the sciences. Is this tendency real? If it is, what consequences could it bring to both the discipline and to us as philosophers of science?
Before jumping into the future, let’s talk about the past and present (in very rough lines). Many decades ago, philosophy of science was arguably an armchair activity. One sees this in the general approach to the main issues discussed at that time: demarcation, underdetermination, theoretical reductionism, explanation, and the relation between history and philosophy of science. All these issues were discussed without close attention to how scientists actually understood them. Here I have in mind classic discussions comprising logical positivists and detractors like Quine, Reichenbach, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and many others. As the story goes, this early period was succeeded by philosophy of the special sciences. Around 1960 to 1970, philosophers shifted their attention to biology, psychology, economics and other scientific domains. They started to reframe the issues of the general philosophy of science as problems for each particular science. An example here would be the discussion about reductionism in genetics (for an early example, see Hull 1974). Along the way, two things became clear. First, general philosophy of science was previously and implicitly biased towards physics. Second, the other sciences were full of specific problems just waiting for philosophical scrutiny. The mere reframing of old questions was not enough. Hence, philosophers of science finally started exploring a more specialized scientific world.
The attention to special sciences did not mean the abandonment of the armchair. The first decades of the philosophy of special sciences were very much based on conceptual analysis of scientific theories, even though philosophers were relying on “textbooks” from different sciences. In this context, Ian Hacking’s experimentalism was an interesting move (1983). It advocated the idea that the analysis of experimental practice – as opposed to abstract theories – could reveal a set of scientific commitments and assumptions not appreciated otherwise. Also of significance was the so-called “naturalistic turn,” namely, close attention to empirical studies and results, as well as the exploration of case-studies and other approaches aligned with scientific methodologies rather than traditional conceptual analysis. For instance, Werner Callebaut’s 1993 edited volume is an important indicator of the spreading of this naturalist principle. Hence, both experimentalism and naturalism inspired philosophers to distance themselves from the armchair. These ideas inspired philosophers to get their hand “dirty” in detailing the practice of science. Consequently, specialization increased and became a natural path for philosophers of science to follow, as seen by the number of philosophers with past undergraduate and graduate degrees in scientific disciplines.
Now let’s talk about the present. As soon as I started my Ph.D. and began to travel for conferences, I observed what would be the current developments of the rough history just outlined: the history of philosophy of science as a history of increased specialization. Here are some crude and non-rigorous observations. First, as traditionally considered, general philosophy of science is modestly practiced by older generations and rarely by younger scholars. Second, philosophy of science in both North-America and Western Europe is dominated by a specialized and naturalistic attitude. There is much evidence for this second point. In particular, there is a strong emphasis on scientific practice in philosophy of science. This turn to practice was institutionalized by the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP), which just completed ten years of existence. SPSP organizes big international conferences every two years and these conferences are more frequently recognized as very inclusive and supportive of a more practice-oriented philosophy of science. In philosophy of biology particularly, the naturalistic attitude is also multi-faceted. In Europe, the Konrad Lorenz Institut and its journal Biological Theory are good examples. Projects carry out in Cambridge UK by Hasok Chang and Tim Lewens, Exeter UK by Egenis, in Bordeaux (France) by Thomas Pradeu’s team also follow the same direction. In North-America, projects led by Alan Love are very clear explorations of the philosophy of science in practice. Recently, the project “From Biological Practice to Metaphysics of Science” led by Love, Ken Waters, Bill Wimsatt and Marcel Weber follows the same path. Here is one thing that I noticed in these and other similar projects (as far as I know them): they encourage, promote, and sometimes even privilege scholars with a strong and preferable formal background in the sciences. Is this the future direction of philosophy of biology and science more generally? Is the promotion of “a strong and even formal background in sciences” the new chapter following the history I outlined before?
Here is where my exercise in futurology begins. Let’s imagine that my last observation is more or less accurate: many important projects and/or research groups in the philosophy of science (or biology) encourage, promote, and even privilege a very strong or formal background in sciences. Interestingly, as far as I can see, many philosophy grad students nowadays have such a background. Many of them did B.As or M.As in the sciences. Indeed, I would guess that the number of people coming from the sciences (or having a scientific background) to the philosophy of science is increasing. Hence, they could have an important advantage over other philosophy grad students if indeed the turn to practice calls for previous science experience. If we consider that the job market is astonishingly competitive, one is led into a vicious circle: students are encouraged to study sciences and, as the number of students with science background increase, they reinforce the importance of science for projects and research groups. One consequence of this is that specialization tends to continue or even further increase in the field. At the institutional level, this sort of dynamic involving the job market, institutions, and students seem to indicate a new phase in our history of specialization. Science background can become important or even decisive for getting a good job in the philosophy of science. Additionally, as the general philosophy experience is replaced by a focus on scientific training, philosophers of science can alienate themselves from their more traditional philosophical peers. I discuss these last two points in what follows.
As I said in the beginning, futurology is cheap as well as inaccurate. There are many ways in which the vicious circle scenario and the consequences I described are too simplistic and most likely mistaken. First, assumptions concerning the job market and institutions are problematic. I don’t have to tell you how complex the job market is, right? This complexity is partially because hiring institutions have different histories and profiles. So, it seems too simplistic the idea that competition will push institutions to prefer philosophers with a strong background in science. Think for example in the case of the teaching institutions/colleges across North-America. They are one of the main employers of philosophers. Would a degree in the sciences or a strong background in them be important for hiring a philosopher in these institutions? It likely depends on the department. What many institutions need is a good philosopher able to connect their teaching with the other faculty. In this context, specialization can even be a bad thing: it can distance the candidate from the faculty working on traditional areas of philosophy. In fact, this distance is one of the big risks of specialization in the philosophy of science faces today. In a recent interview, Elliott Sober shows concern with this risk in the philosophy of science. According to him, the future of our discipline depends on philosophers of science “redoubling their efforts to connect what they are doing to other areas of philosophy.”
Here is a second scenario: research-driven institutions will hire the philosophers with a heavy background in sciences, while teaching-driven institutions hire philosophers with more traditional training. This scenario seems to make more sense than the previous one. After all, the teaching institutions would prefer to have philosophers with the capacity to teach large portions of standard philosophical topics. In contrast, research-driven institutions want philosophers capable of attracting research funding and producing breakthroughs. Since the philosophy of science already follows the path of specialization and naturalism, the way to attract funding and produce breakthroughs would be by establishing an even closer relation with the sciences. Hence, philosophers with a strong or formal background in science would be in the spotlight, again.
But is this second scenario likely? Well, it is still very simplistic because it doesn’t take into account the histories and profiles of different research-driven institutions. Even though naturalism and specialization seem to be an overall tendency, why should we believe that most respectable research-driven institutions tend to hire philosophers of science with a strong or formal background in the sciences? What about big institutions with a profile of favoring traditional work on the philosophy of science? Is it not the case that such institutions usually have a particular research agenda? Additionally, let’s think for a second in hiring committees. Giving the heterogeneous formation of these committees, there are reasons to say that even in big research-driven institutions philosophers of science with a strong background in science will not be necessarily favored over other philosophers. Additionally, why assume that attracting funding and producing philosophical breakthroughs are easy to achieve when a philosopher of science works more closely with science nowadays? It is hard to have good answers for these questions when we only have a glimpse of what the field is like and no proper ways to do sociology and history of philosophy. This is why the scenarios I discussed look so sketchy. Hence, maybe I should stop here.
All these questions and scenarios pop up in my head as I try to do futurology. As far as specialization and naturalism go, I can’t help but think that the future belongs to scientist-philosophers. These are the well-trained science students who become philosophers. However, the future also has room for philosopher-scientists, i.e., those philosophers who will be able to connect with scientists and get strong scientific training along with their philosophical education. They don’t become scientists (well, some even do!) but they find in the scientific community a suitable host for academic parasitism and mutualism. Of course, scientist-philosophers and philosopher-scientists face different challenges: the former needs to minimally catch up with certain portions of the philosophical tradition, while the latter needs (not minimally, but strongly) catch up with science. But what about a third figure, the philosopher-philosopher? These are the philosophers of science without much scientific training but still very sharp analytical skills. They contribute to the philosophy of science mostly by doing conceptual analysis. Is this figure going extinct in the future? Does the increase of scientists philosophers lead to the decrease of philosophers philosophers? Can this increase also lead to the decrease of philosophers scientists? You tell me!
–Celso
A Philosopher's Take 
Justin Caouette
April 18, 2017
Excellent post and excellent questions, Celso!
Beyond the role that this specialization might play in hiring, what do you think such specialization does to alienate philosophers of science from other philosophers? I’ve been to a number of talks where half of the talk is about some science example and much of the argument put forth by the philosopher of science rides on that example.
This sort of scenario protects the presenter from fielding difficult philosophical questions by hiding behind their specialized science example (intentionally or not). This can cause a disconnect between the philosopher of science and other philosophers who are not engaged in the specified science and further alienate them from their philosophical peers.
This sort of scenario also leads many non-philosophers of science to look at such work as “non-philosophical”. Have you noticed this trend?
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Justin Caouette
April 18, 2017
Celso, I had some further thoughts, particularly related to you last paragraph.
You say: “As far as specialization and naturalism go, I can’t help but think that the future belongs to scientist-philosophers. These are the well-trained science students who become philosophers.”
You might be right, but is this a good thing for philosophy? Why not just have science students stay in science and ask deep philosophical questions and press on hasty conclusions that their peers might be making? Why fill philosophy departments with folks who have spent their time on the history of science rather than the history of philosophical ideas?
And this speaks to a final thought I had. You write: “But what about a third figure, the philosopher-philosopher? These are the philosophers of science without much scientific training but still very sharp analytical skills. They contribute to the philosophy of science mostly by doing conceptual analysis. Is this figure going extinct in the future?”
To your last question, I hope not! I consider myself a philosopher-philosopher and one of the reasons I have gotten better at philosophy is because I have read a bunch of different philosophy (instead of science). In reading large swaths of philosophy-philosophy I have noticed argument styles and ways to frame philosophical questions that can be applied to other areas of philosophy. If I had spent time getting an MA in some science instead of focusing primarily on Philosophy I doubt I would have furthered my philosophical skills in the same way.
That said, I also was a Psychology major during my undergrad years and I do think this has helped me to be informed in a way that makes my philosophical work better. So I am torn as to how much time we should spend outside of the discipline to gain this added knowledge and at what point this time away brings negative returns.
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Celso Neto
April 18, 2017
Let me address some of your points here:
1. Alienation happens because, as specialization increases, philosophers of science need to do more effort to adequately motivate and highlight the “philosophical meat” in their work. But to do this motivation work properly is hard even for good and well-trained philosophers. So, talking to other grad students and young scholars, I have the impression that we often get in trouble when doing that motivation work. It is so hard! This is usually a reason why talks given by me and some peers don’t go so well. That being said, the specialization indeed opens a flank for those who want to hide themselves and purposefully alienate their audiences. Talking too much about science can be a way to do obscure philosophy in some sense!
Unfortunately, I still don’t have a feeling whether non-philosophers of science in North America and West Europe end up labelling the specialized naturalistic philsci as “non philosophical work”. But I definitely see how they could do it. In fact, and here is a footnote about philsci worldwide, in Brazil and some Latin American countries the labelling of specialized naturalistic philsci as “non philosophy” clearly happens. This is easy to spot because in these countries continental philosophy has a huge impact. So, continental philosophers there usually tread more specialized philsci as mere “science report”.
2. Is it a good thing for philsci to be dominated by scientists-philosophers? Here I share this intuition (in some respects already pushed forward by folks like Feyerabend and Longino) that plurality of perspectives and background is of great value for knowledge-seeking activities. I tend to think that philsci should be very promiscuous, getting together all sorts of philosophers. Here is an image: Philsci should comprise an spectrum (or a chain) of scholars: on one extreme we have the scientist and on the other extreme we have the very conceptual-analysis old-fashioned a priori-ish philosopher. Then we have all these intermediate links that enable are not only important in themselves but also enable the communication to transfer from one extreme to the other. Anyway, these are just intuitions of mine.
3. The philosopher-philosopher is not going extinct, I think. But the population is shrinking in philsci and this is dangerous. If we don’t have many philosopher-philosophers around, it can become easier for philsci to alienate from philosophy even further. From a theoretical point of view, philsci can be alienated from certain aspects of its own remote history and roots. From a professional point of view, specialized philosophers of science can start having serious troubles in the job market. These are just two examples of how dangerous the situation can be.
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Justin Caouette
April 18, 2017
Well said! I especially agree with the importance of a plurality of perspectives. I don’t know Feyerabend’s work but Longino seems right on this (we read her in Ken Waters seminar a few years back). I found a similar thread of thought in JS Mill in his discussion of experiments in living.
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Sue
April 18, 2017
Interesting post. One of your concerns is that applicants with a scientific background may have a leg up on the job market. I have had significant training in a science and obtained high-level formal qualifications to prove it. But I never had a better chance on the job market than those without it, quite the opposite. I got the only TT I was ever interviewed for. And the people who got the jobs I would have liked had either no or much less science background. What they did have, however, were (1) pedigree and/or (2) well-connected advisors and/or (2) ‘hot topics’ (I didn’t see much of a difference with respect to pubs, teaching experience, or other factors). An anecdote, of course. In addition, I think there really is such a thing as having ‘too much’ of a science background. As you said, one can have (or be perceived to have) too little potential to connect with mainstream areas and potential colleagues. Getting a BSc, at most one MSc, may be good, but anything beyond that may well work against you. Many philosophers seem to believe that a BSc is sufficient to demonstrate that you know your science.
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Celso Neto
April 19, 2017
Interesting perspective Sue! Certainly all the factors you mention are super important and maybe much more decisive than having a science degree or not. Certainly if you don’t have pedigree and well-connected advisors your chance in the job market is very bad anyway. I wonder though why having a PhD in the sciences work against you. To me, a double PhD in philosophy and the sciences seems to be a great thing, don’t you think?
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Brandon Beasley
April 18, 2017
Great post Celso. Lots to chew on here, but here is just one thought:
I think that philosophers can be incredibly useful partners with scientists when they work “in the trenches”, as it were, directly on the empirical and conceptual issues of particular scientific practices and theories. In this, I suppose the scientist-philosopher and the philosopher-scientist fulfill sort of the same role.
However, I also agree heartily with Sober’s comment that philosophers of science should be “redoubling their efforts to connect what they are doing to other areas of philosophy.” Because, after all, if philosophers of science are to contribute something to *philosophy*, and not just scientific work, they ought to continue to take stances on some of the “old-fashioned” general philosophy of science issues, like demarcation, realism, reductionism, evidence, explanation, and other more general metaphysical and epistemological issues. (Not to mention the contributions that might be made to ethics, particularly applied ethics). You refer to “philosopher-philosophers” as sort of aiming to do this, but imply that such people wouldn’t really have the detailed knowledge of the philosopher-scientists. Which is why I wonder if the philosopher-scientists shouldn’t also make it their goal, as Sober says, to take what they have done in the special sciences and bring it back to the issues of more general philosophical importance.
If there is one thing that my time among the philosophers of science at Calgary has shown me, it is that contemporary philosophy of the special sciences has *a lot* to teach us about how to think about more general issues, like reductionism, realism, evidence, and the role of practices in producing knowledge. This progress should not be confined to work in the philosophy of special sciences, but ought to make its way out to the broader philosophical community. I do wonder if the trends you identify might make this less likely, and that would be a bad thing indeed.
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Celso Neto
April 19, 2017
Thanks for the insightful comments Brandon! I definitely think that philosopher-scientists need to bring the issues back to more general philosophical issues. On a theoretical level, this is important because it feeds philsci (and philosophy in general) with new and ever-changing perspectives. On a institutional level, it also changes the perception other philosophers have of this more empirically-heavy philsci as “science reporting”. My feeling is that, if the trends I describe are correct, philosophers of science can start unconsciously (or not) to disregarding those general philosophical issues completely. But maybe this is a very unlikely and pessimistic scenario, right?
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Lucas J. Matthews
April 18, 2017
Questions about jobs aside, it’s important to keep in mind that scientists who learn philosophy do better science, and philosophers who learn the science do better philosophy (of science, at least). And isn’t that what this is all about — doing quality philosophy and science?
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Celso Neto
April 19, 2017
Definitely quality philosophy and science are done when each side is informed by the other! Maybe a more subtle question would be in which ways a philosopher has to be informed by science in order to do quality philosophy, right? Or, I wonder how much space old-fashioned conceptual analysis-driven philosophers of science would have in the current and future philsci. What kind and degree of contact with the actual science would be required from them?
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Alison K McConwell
April 18, 2017
Great post Celso! You say at the end, “…they find in the scientific community a suitable host for academic parasitism and mutualism.” Can you say a bit more about what you mean by this? By “parasitism” do you mean that the philosopher is not necessarily benefiting science?
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Celso Neto
April 19, 2017
Thanks for helping me with this Alison! The answer to your question is “yes”! More precisely, here is what I mean: one way for philosophers of science to know the science well and develop a nice work is to act like as being in a symbiotic relation. She goes to the sciences (labs, meetings), read the literature, hang out with scientists, absorb their knowledge and also run her ideas by them. Hence, the philosopher benefits from the scientist. This is the key point. Whether the scientists also benefits from the philosopher is another question. In some cases there are mutual benefit (mutualism) but in other cases there aren’t (parasitism). By saying “parasitism and mutualism” I intended to make room for both types of cases.
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Mike Steiner
April 20, 2017
Going through my PhD in Philosophy of Science I certainly felt that much more consideration was given (for TT positions, conferences, publications, etc.) to those philosophers who had significant formal training (or even previous careers!) in the sciences. Being a scientist-turned-philosopher was almost like getting “street credibility”: sure, anyone can wax philosophical, but if you actually come from the sciences you must not be blowing hot air, and people take notice. A telltale sign, as mentioned in a comment above, would be a group of philosophers listening to a very “sciency” talk about an excruciatingly narrow, highly specific topic, that very few of us could even understand due to the associated jargon and background knowledge required. It was almost like phil of sci was going through an existential crisis where it needed validation, and bringing scientists in-house imported some immediate relief from irrelevance. Of course, this was just my perception. It was enough to make me feel quite insecure whenever I spoke about various issues in the philosophy of science, so much so that I often wondered whether I should just go get a degree in science in order to be a proper philosopher! After all, I’m not a biologist, so what business do I have talking about biology? I was thus a philosopher-philosopher, and restricted my thoughts to the conceptual linkages or commonalities across all the sciences, just dipping my toes into each one and never diving too deep into any, lest a scientist-philosopher come from the deep and snatch me up! 🙂 Cross-pollination is always good, as I mentioned in my post on Cognitive Dissonance, but I too am worried about the future (or need) for philosophy of science…
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