Browsing All Posts filed under »Neuroscience«

Barack Obama Is Not My Father: A Simple Argument Against Physicalism

March 26, 2016 by

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The following is a rather simple (simplistic?) argument against certain forms of physicalism*, specifically, those forms which identify the conscious mind with physical processes of the brain. The argument starts with the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (thank you, Leibniz), which is usually uncontroversial: If A and B are one and the same thing, […]

Hey, Neuroscience, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Objections to Substance Dualism (Part 1)

October 7, 2015 by

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For many who’ve taken philosophy courses at the university level (let alone those who teach philosophy), substance dualism appears to be a theory with, dare I say it, no substance. It’s not a “live option.” But, to extend the pun, I think it’s the dismissal, not the theory, that lacks substance. In the introduction to this series of posts, I […]

A Free Will Resource via Al Mele

August 25, 2014 by

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Al Mele, one of the most distinguished and recognizable philosophers writing on free will has launched a new blog where he plans to field questions and generate discussion a few times a week (see the blog here). He hopes to answer questions related to his last two books where he takes on scientific claims that […]

Sam Harris Still Needs to Read More Philosophy

February 12, 2014 by

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In a scathing review of Sam Harris’ pamphlet Free Will , Daniel Dennett rightfully calls out Harris for some obvious missteps that Harris has taken (once again).  Harris responds here. Though I am more aligned with incompatibilism these days, Harris again makes some serious missteps in his response. First, he forwards his compatibilist thesis with regards to […]

Romantic Dysfunction, BPD, and Moral Responsibility

January 22, 2014 by

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It is commonly argued that for one to be morally responsible, one must have control over one’s actions (see here for a run-down on arguments for that claim). Now, one does not generally concede that a person is moral pariah simply because the person is in the deepest stages of love, even if we do tend to […]

The Importance of Free Will

June 29, 2013 by

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For those who think that a belief in free will is not that important I refer you to this excellent piece by Rebbeca Roach. I further some of the issues raised by Roach and will be posting on it soon, as soon as I get a draft of my candidacy complete which also happens to […]

What Can Philosophers Of Mind Learn From Being in Love?

June 23, 2013 by

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An underlying project for many philosophers of mind is to form general theories about the nature of consciousness and mental states. One general theory of consciousness identifies mental states with physical states. In the philosophy of mind game, we call these “physicalist identity theories”. These theories basically assert that every type of mental state is […]

Concussions and Informed Consent

June 10, 2013 by

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My soon to be 10 year old step-son wants to play football. I guess this should not come as a surprise. He has watched me get entertained by the sport for as long as he can remember. I taught him how to throw a football, run a crisp stop and go, and had many discussions […]

Neuroscience and Free Will: New study debunks Libet’s interpretation

August 10, 2012 by

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The interconnection of neuroscience and free will has many researchers trying to make bold claims about their findings. In my last post I called Sam Harris’ conclusion that “free will is an illusion” into question. Specifically, I suggested that there were competing interpretations that could be made from the data that neuroscientist Benjamin Libet was […]

Free Will: Why Sam Harris needs to read more Philosophy

July 29, 2012 by

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In his book ‘Free Will’ (2012) Sam Harris offers up the conclusion that “free will is an illusion”. I can’t say that I’m surprised given the fact that  many neuroscientists have offered up similar responses to the free will problem (Libet 83′, 99′, 01′, 03′, among others) . But, falling in line with Libet and other neuroscientists […]