In his recent book, John Loftus argues that we ought to stop teaching philosophy of religion. This is not an extended review of the book; I might read it in the future and write a more fleshed out review, but rather a response to the excerpt (in the link above) that Hemant Mehta posted recently; it is an argument that I’ve heard before, though I’m sure Loftus’ articulation is somewhat more developed than the versions I’ve heard in passing.
A quick caveat; I’m currently TAing a course in philosophy of religion. I am not myself particularly interested in religion, and (as I’ll discuss) I have some sympathies to Loftus’ criticism of the state of the discipline.
The major concern is that Loftus’ characterization of philosophy of religion strikes me as just flatly wrong. There are a number of pragmatic and pedagogical reasons to teach philosophy of religion. (It gets students, most of whom are religious, motivated to look carefully at philosophical problems; it helps non-religious students understand the history and anthropology of religion and philosophy; it allows professors to cover a broad array of topics in other philosophical sub-disciplines with a unifying subject matter; etc.) Suppose that these sorts of considerations aren’t enough. As Loftus responds in his own discussion:
“The precise nature of my call is to end the philosophy of religion discipline in secular universities. It basically follows the same strategy Dr. Hector Avalos advocates in his book titled The End of Biblical Studies. Avalos argues that religion professors and those teaching in biblical studies departments should tell their students the truth about the Bible even though it’s considered sacred to many of them. Essentially his call is to debunk the Bible for the good of any future society we might have. So similarly, I’m calling upon philosophy of religion professors to do likewise with the arguments to the existence of God.”
There are parts of this to which I must admit I am very sympathetic; I think Loftus is right that the arguments to the existence of God fail, and fail fairly spectacularly. I think that the arguments, further, are generally pretty bad philosophy. (There are some exceptions, but as a general assessment of the discipline, I’m inclined to spot Loftus this point of criticism.)
I’m a bit skeptical of Loftus’ characterization of philosophy of religion, and this is partly because I’ve spent a lot of time in philosophy of religion classes at secular universities, interacting with friends who are taking introductory level courses, and now going through the process of teaching such a course. I know of cases like what Loftus describes, where a professor at a secular university confuses his class for a Campus Crusade for Christ meeting; but I don’t know if that’s a problem with teaching the subject matter so much as an observation that some people are bad at their jobs.
I’m inclined to spot Loftus this point, as well, though. Because one might imagine that if the problem were pervasive enough and localized enough to philosophy of religion, he might be justified in making this sort of claim. I think this is probably not so, and that the best explanation is that I’m biased by working with pretty good professors and his experience involves working with and hearing about pretty bad ones, but it’s the sort of thing that one could collect empirical evidence about and evaluate.
The more serious problem is that, even if I bought all of this, it doesn’t seem like this implies that we ought to abolish philosophy of religion. Similarly, nothing Avalos says in that discussion suggests that we ought to abolish Biblical Studies; rather, we (meaning those who teach philosophy of religion) ought to do a better job at establishing standards and practices for teaching. We should aspire to be James Kugel rather than a Sunday school preacher; we should aspire to be the late greats Richard Gale or Hilary Putnam, rather than… well… the folks Loftus studied with at Lincoln Christian University or Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.
Like teaching about safe sex, teaching students about how to make better arguments, giving them the skills to make and evaluate arguments about the things that interest them, is important. Given that, like sex, we can reasonably expect students to have discussions about God at 3am in the dorms, we ought to (like sex) do our best to ensure that they make good decisions and avoid disastrous consequences.
If the suggestion that Loftus has in mind is that we (again, those who teach philosophy of religion) ought to express our own skepticism and attitudes and dismissal of bad arguments more widely, then I suppose I’m somewhat sympathetic. It is useful for students to be aware that many of the arguments they are hearing on apologetics message boards are not just philosophically specious, but also very bad… however, my experience as a student and teacher suggests that just pointing out that arguments are bad is not the best way to engage students. Rather, the goal has to be to illustrate why the arguments are bad, and ultimately that requires (at least initially) entertaining the possibility that they might not be bad, interpreting them charitably, and evaluating them critically. That’s not really localized to philosophy of religion; that’s just a matter of what it is to teach philosophy well.
Gordon Hawkes
December 11, 2016
It is an odd “call” for Loftus to put out, if only because almost all (if not all) his published work is in the area of philosophy of religion, specifically, arguing against religion and for atheism. (His book’s thesis: “Don’t teach my books.”)
Also, Loftus’ call to end the teaching of the philosophy of religion seems to already assume that all religion is false–but that’s precisely what is at issue in the philosophy of religion. Naturalism might be true, and a majority of professionals might agree with Loftus, but why intentionally make oneself and one’s students ignorant of the other side, which happens to include many of the top minds in the history of philosophy?
Lastly, would Loftus want to end the teaching of work like “Of Miracles” by David Hume, or Plato’s “Euthyphro”? Even if you eliminated all classes called “philosophy of religion,” you’d be left with the history of philosophy which overwhelmingly emphasizes questions that many would consider to be religious in nature.
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Lage
December 12, 2016
As a strong atheist and former evangelical protestant Christian, I sympathize with Loftus’ position a bit — having seen the self-delusion brought on by certain religious beliefs and the unfortunate coincident validation of those ridiculous beliefs provided by intellectualizing it in philosophy. However, I also understand that there are a number of uses for philosophy of religion, including showing the ontological, metaphysical, and ethical frameworks underlying deeply culturally integrated belief systems. It’s important to know what religious followers think and to inform people of the implications of those beliefs when taken to their logical conclusion including the effects on all their other planets of beliefs, the effects on society, etc. Thus, I still see a role for philosophy of religion though I am in line with your point that it is important that teachers of philosophy of religion are teaching properly and putting the concepts taught into context in terms of their epistemological limitations, and how they track with logic, reason, and evidence.
Similarly I can see there being a “Philosophy of cognitive biases” being taught, and with good reason. We may not endorse cognitive biases or desire them, but it is important to know how they effect our beliefs whether ontological, epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, etc. This is important because cognitive biases play a big role in everyone’s beliefs, even if we wished they didn’t. Likewise religion plays a big role in many people’s beliefs and plays a role in everyone’s lives (religious or not) due to the second-hand effects of religious beliefs on secular societies and people. Therefore maintaining the instruction of a philosophy that seeks to outline these beliefs systems or much of their foundation is important. Good post!
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philosotroll
December 12, 2016
The “cognitive bias” example is an interesting one; you might suppose that “philosophy of cognitive bias” (or, more commonly, the psychology) is an appropriate subject matter because it allows us to actually reduce cognitive bias. This is where the analogy splits off to me, and perhaps a point of substantive disagreement with Loftus. I don’t think the job of a philosophy of religion class is to reduce religious adherence, belief, etc. It may do this by virtue of reducing uncritical, poorly founded, or incoherent beliefs, but that’s rather different than having a particular religious position as the goal.
I suspect Loftus and I agree that, if philosophy of religion is going to be taught, that it be taught well. I know that Loftus’ experiences with his education in philosophy of religion were largely informed by people who are atrocious teachers. (I know this because I’ve read his writing on the subject, with a lot of interest.) I hope that none of us think that it’s ok for philosophy of religion to be taught badly.
Then again, there are lots of writers in popular philosophy who don’t seem to have a problem teaching the general public badly in other domains… and many of those are instances of pop-atheist writing, though that’s another rant.
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Lage
December 13, 2016
Regarding the cognitive bias analogy, it’s true that we want to reduce cognitive bias, but it need not be true for the purposes of my analogy. My main point was that religion pervades the thoughts and belief systems of many individuals and cultures as do cognitive biases so having philosophy courses and fields that address these highly influential components of our belief systems is important regardless of whether we want to reduce those cognitive biases or reduce religion in some way. It is more a matter of better understanding these phenomena since they are so ubiquitous and influential. It just happens to be the case that by better understanding them, many are persuaded to combat cognitive biases (and discard or actively combat religion). Know what I mean?
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philosotroll
December 13, 2016
I follow, though I don’t know that I think that’s as good an argument for philosophy of religion so much as anthropology/sociology of religion. As someone who does work in the social sciences, it seems like this is some important disciplinary slippage. That’s not to say that the two are different, but I do think the learning objectives in philosophy of religion differ from what you’re describing in some important ways.
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Lage
December 14, 2016
Philosophy of religion, as assumed in my analogy, addresses things like religious language and belief, religious pluralism, relativism, exclusivism, concepts of God and arguments for and against God, the coherence of theism, interplay between religion and science, etc. While I think my analogy could apply to the social sciences as well, it need not. One need only recognize that the concepts I just mentioned affect people’s thinking and their behavior and so learning about those near ubiquitous concepts to understand them and thus understand what so many people think is important.
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Brandon Beasley
December 12, 2016
Great post Josh. I eagerly read this, as philosophy of religion (and religion generally) is an interest of mine. On my road to fully embracing atheism and secular humanism, and in the pursuit of better understanding the cultural and intellectual history in which I find myself, getting to deeply understand religion and then taking a critical philosophical look at it was extremely important. So I came here to see if I could contribute anything to the discussion, but I find that I don’t think I have anything to add to or quibble with in your post!
In general, though, I think the following is a poor form of argument: Some instances of X are bad, therefore we should eliminate X. This ignores the possibility that instances of X can be good, and in a variety of ways! The only way to make this argument work is to change the “Some” to “All”, and hold that there is no possible good reasons to teach philosophy of religion. And I do not think a good case can be made for that. It is just too pedagogically useful, historically important, and culturally relevant to ignore.
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philosotroll
December 12, 2016
I’m not sure that arguments of that form are quite so restrictive. As I say above, if Loftus could establish that there is a pervasive problem in philosophy of religion, and that the problem is intractable and directly caused by the subject matter, then I think the argument could go through. In lots of social science we allow arguments like, “x systematically causes y; y is a serious moral problem; though x is not necessarily causally related to y, it has a systematically causal relationship in enough circumstances that we ought to do away with it.”
The thing is, I don’t think the argument that Loftus argues establishes those sorts of moves nearly well enough, and is pretty overtly contrary to my own experience; it also neglects the positive value of teaching philosophy of religion.
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Brandon Beasley
December 12, 2016
That’s fair. I suppose the brunt of my point would be contained in just what would count as establishing “x systematically causes y”.
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philosotroll
December 12, 2016
Yeah, I think that’s absolutely right. The for establishing “x systematically causes y” is difficult. I think in this case, though, there good reason to think it isn’t systematic. (But, again, I try to push that off as an empirical point; the Pew Center should do a study.)
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vizi01
January 4, 2017
Like your articles. Really glad that you’re into philosophy!
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