My 5th post over at Flickers is up, check it out here. I’ve copied and pasted it below for those not interested in clicking (and following comments).
Cheers!
In the last post I suggested that moral responsibility may not come in degrees and based on the discussion that ensued it seems that we are pretty torn on whether or not it does. In this post I would like to focus on a different question: are psychopaths morally responsible for their behavior? This debate is dear to me as it is the first debate I weighed in on as a PhD student. In response to Haji 2010, I argued that if we are morally responsible, then psychopaths are morally responsible as well. There is no morally salient difference between *our abilities* (non psychopaths) and those of the psychopath (I’ll speak to this a bit more in a second). If one admits that we are sometimes morally responsible for at least some of what we do, then one should conclude the same re: psychopaths. So, where do we all stand on this issue? Morally responsible or not? I’m thinking that like the last question I raised that we will be pretty torn on this front as well. I should note that the philosophical literature seems to weigh in favor of exculpating the psychopath or so it seems,( see Haji 1998;2010; Levy 2007 and 2014; Shoemaker 2011 for a few approaches to why this is so) whereas a commonly held view by non-philosophers seems to be that psychopaths are morally responsible for what they do. Having worked with young adults being treated for an array of psychopathic traits in the past (for 5 years at a residential program), it is also worth noting that many of them hold themselves morally responsible for what they do as well. So, to get the discussion going I’ll offer an overly brief summary of the debate and mention why they might not be morally responsible and offer some reasons for thinking they might be. I’ll be quick and fast because I know most of you are pretty versed in the literature. In the end, I’d like to hear why folks think they are morally responsible (or not). What condition do they fail to meet? I particularly like this debate because of the interdisciplinary feature of the research, but I digress.
The question of whether the psychopath is morally responsible for his actions has received much attention within psychological, legal, and philosophical circles over the past 20 years. There is debate within each tradition as to whether we should treat the psychopath differently than we do other criminals (assuming the psychopath commits a crime). The psychological debate has focused on the psychopath’s ability to utilize cognitive faculties when theorizing about how one ought to act. The legal debate has focused on the punishment of these individuals and how the insanity plea can be applied to them. Because they seem irrational at times, the term ‘moral insanity’ has been used to describe them (Benn 1999, Levy 2007). This causes friction for the judge and/or jurors trying to justly sentence the psychopath because the insanity plea suggests a different approach to their treatment. The philosophical debate has taken a few different approaches to the problem (though I should note that the aforemetnioned approaches have not been restricted to any one discipline, I am grossly summarizing here).
The first approach tried to assess which kinds of moral knowledge the psychopath could possess (Fields 1996, Glannon 1997, Haji 1998, Levy 2007a). But, this debate seems to be at a stalemate . As Neil Levy notes; “…given that both the truth and the best interpretation of MI (motivational internalism) is extremely controversial, this argument did not serve to advance the debate.” The debate was rooted in discussion about which relevant moral beliefs the psychopath was capable of having given that the psychopath was motivated differently and seemingly without the appropriate motivations .
The second approach focused on the psychopath’s failure to grasp the moral/conventional distinction (Levy 2007a, Levy 2007b, Nichols &Vargas 2007a, Showmaker 2011). The argument there goes something like this; since the psychopath lacks the relevant moral knowledge to be deemed morally responsible the psychopath is unable to control their actions in light of moral reasons because those reasons can only map on to a conventional distinction and not a purely moral one (Levy 2007a). Advocates of holding the psychopath culpable say they may have sufficient knowledge to act morally . Without proof of a lacking of other sorts of knowledge that may be at play when morally theorizing we shouldn’t be quick to revise our intuitions regarding the culpability of the psychopath. I do not think that these two debates are much different from one another. With that said, it doesn’t seem that we have heard sufficient evidence on either side to declare one side wrong, conclusively (even though I find the arguments by Vargas and Nichols a bit more persuasive). This brings us to the third approach and the most current literature within the debate surrounding the responsibility of psychopaths. This approach focuses on three main elements; emotional sensitivity, ethical perception, and a tracing condition centered on an agent’s responsibility of his current dispositional attitudes. This last approach, put forth by IshHaji (Haji 2010), has not yet received much attention.
In “Psychopathy, Ethical Perception, and Moral Culpability”(2010) Haji claims that psychopaths will either 1) not be morally culpable for their actions, or, 2) their degree of moral culpability will be diminished, perhaps considerably so, in light of their lack of emotional sensitivity (recall the relevance of our last discussion on degrees of moral responsibility). Haji offers support for these claims by appealing to a multitude of recent and widely accepted psychological research. The above mentioned two-fold conclusion rests on the conclusions of 3 separate but closely related arguments which he justifies by use of this research. Suffice to say that because psychopaths lack empathy (emotional sensitivity) this has a decided influence on their ethical perception. And, because ethical perception impacts our understanding of moral reasons to act or refrain from acting it follows that psychopaths might not be able to acquire moral knowledge. Assuming that the psychopath is not morally responsible for their emotional insensitivity it follows that the psychopath might not be morally responsible for their actions/behavior.
To see why the fact that psychopaths lack emotional sensitivity (empathy) is relevant consider a case by Gilbert Harman (1977): You round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pouring gasoline on a cat and igniting it. As Harman remarks, and Haji suggests; “you do not need to conclude that what…(the hoodlums) are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out. You can see that it is wrong” (Harman 1977, Haji 2010). Here, you can see the work that ethical perception is doing. It seems to be informing our moral intuitions or reactions to the igniting of the cat . Anyone “properly morally trained” should recognize through ethical perception, which has as its central feature emotional sensitivity, that the igniting of the cat is wrong. How could we expect a psychopath to see this as wrong if they are lacking the central feature of ethical perception, emotional sensitivity, that allows them to see it as such?
For those who might find this line of argument persuasive, how we perceive the situation has priority over what we decide– this make sense. However, why think that empathy is the only emotion or faculty bearing on our ethical perception, or that empathy is*necessary* in order to perceive a scenario as moral or not? (once we ask this question we seem to fall back into the debate between Levy and Nichols and Vargas) Further, it might be the case that in passive cases, often ommissions (like Harman’s example) empathy is central to our ethical perception, but, in the more interesting cases, the active cases (where there is deliberation involved on the part of the psychopath), it seems that much deliberation is needed to act successfully and it’s not clear to me that an empathetic emotion is *needed* to conclude that one ought not perform an action on moral grounds(Paul Bloom has recently done some work on empathy that favors this line of thinking). This seems to fetishize empathy and I’m not convinced that we need a high-level of it to properly assess a situation as moral or not. I’m much more confident that such an emotion is an important feature that helps us sustain deep interpersonal relationships, but that’s a different conversation.
A sports analogy may be apt here; does the budding basketball player need to have a great jump shot to be a good player? I don’t think that she does. She could be good in other facets of the game (recognizing other relevant moral features) and lack a good jump shot (altogether) and still be considered a valuable contributor to the team (or a moral agentmoral community) She may have a hard time playing against teams that allow one to shoot but defend the drive rigorously—but overall, she could still be considered a good player and even in those cases can . Similarly, it seems that the psychopath could be lacking in empathy which could affect her ability to ethically perceive correctly in many passive cases, however, in active cases it seems he could get by just fine. And, in such cases, it would seem appropraite to hold them morally responsible.
Well, I’d be interested to see how others see the state of the debate; are psychopaths morally responsible for at least some of what they do?
A Philosopher's Take 
Lage
January 20, 2015
“To see why the fact that psychopaths lack emotional sensitivity (empathy) is relevant consider a case by Gilbert Harman (1977): You round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pouring gasoline on a cat and igniting it. As Harman remarks, and Haji suggests; “you do not need to conclude that what…(the hoodlums) are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out. You can see that it is wrong” (Harman 1977, Haji 2010). Here, you can see the work that ethical perception is doing. It seems to be informing our moral intuitions or reactions to the igniting of the cat . Anyone “properly morally trained” should recognize through ethical perception, which has as its central feature emotional sensitivity, that the igniting of the cat is wrong. How could we expect a psychopath to see this as wrong if they are lacking the central feature of ethical perception, emotional sensitivity, that allows them to see it as such?”
As I stated in my previous response to the post regarding luck, choice, egalitarianism, etc., we have to assume some moral axioms here before anyone can agree on what is right or wrong in the first place. Assuming that our moral intuitions are guiding such an axiom (or axioms), then it seems that empathy is a must here (as it drives our moral axiom of maximizing compassion or well being for conscious creatures). If there is no understanding of the feelings of another (including the feelings of a cat that is being lit on fire), then what would possibly drive any abhorrence in the action of doing so? Other than merely being “taught” that it is wrong, what emotional motivations does the psychopath have to refrain from such an act?
“For those who might find this line of argument persuasive, how we perceive the situation has priority over what we decide– this make sense. However, why think that empathy is the only emotion or faculty bearing on our ethical perception, or that empathy is*necessary* in order to perceive a scenario as moral or not?”
I think that you make a good point by mentioning that empathy may not be the ONLY emotion or faculty bearing on our ethical perception, but it is likely the primary and necessary one and often drives other emotions in the process. I’ll also mention that cultural transmission of memes can be propagated that endorse what many call “morally reprehensible” behaviors (like those in many religions), and it would be difficult to believe that those cultures or religious followers that do so are entirely comprised of psychopaths. Rather, it seems that ethical perception is mostly innate, or perhaps most strongly influenced by our innate predispositions regarding a particular situation, but when these predispositions are put into a cultural context, what was previously seen as “wrong” may no longer be so. So we seem to have an amalgam between our socially advantageous innate trait of empathy, and our culturally inherited perceptions of how to apply that empathy. Furthermore, we have reason and rationality (to some degree) which can more effectively apply that empathy based on culturally inherited knowledge regarding the consequences of our actions. For example, if I were a dentist, one may excuse my perceived lack of empathy by painfully drilling out a patient’s cavity, by realizing that the long-term benefit I’m providing them which includes less overall pain is actually more empathetic than simply letting the cavity fester and avoid drilling altogether. Nevertheless, it seems that empathy is necessary in all these cases in order to perceive a scenario as moral, IF a moral intuition exists or those morals are emotionally driven or reinforced, and not merely learned facts. It seems that without empathy, one can’t even arrive at any intuitive moral axiom in the first place, at least, not one that non-psychopaths would see as desirable, nor sufficient. Especially since our moral philosophy is ultimately driven by our understanding that “others have feelings just like I do”, and we want to maximize for others the same feelings and well being that we ourselves enjoy.
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angramainyu2014
January 20, 2015
Justin,
Interesting post (I did read the following comments).
My two cents:
I tend to agree that empathy is probably not required to make proper moral assessments. However, in any case, there is research suggesting that psychopaths actually are quite capable of empathy, but they usually don’t switch empathy on – at least, not when it comes to their victims, if they have victims.
Source: http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/136/8/2550.full?ijkey=CqWen0GPOBYJVDY&keytype=ref
On the issue of moral responsibility, in a colloquial sense, I would understand that to hold them morally responsible for their actions is to hold that their actions are immoral (or morally wrong), which is to say they’re blameworthy, and yes I do think their actions are immoral.
But in the context of these debates about moral responsibility, I’m not sure I have the right concept.
At any rate, I think psychopaths behave immorally, deserve punishment for their behavior, etc. Having the ability to switch their empathy off would not seem to change that, or even not being capable of empathy wouldn’t.
I also think they have free will, though it’s compatibilist FW, so it’s not the same free will you have in mind.
Incidentally, while they don’t feel guilt or remorse (usually, at least) it seems to me they are quite capable of knowing their moral obligations, even if they’re not motivated by their assessments (I don’t agree with any sort of motivational internalism). If they didn’t, it seems to me (I might need to give some argument, though) that they would probably be utterly socially inept, yet many psychopaths are well capable of pretending to be good people, some are effective con artists, and so on.
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Justin Caouette
January 20, 2015
Thanks for the thoughtful comment, Angra.
And thanks for that link. FWIW, I argue that they can understand empathy sufficiently so the link is helpful to help substantiate that claim. I also claim that their worldview is partly the cause of why they can shut it off or on. So, the Peter Singer’s of the world won’t be as emotionally pulled in when someone appeals to Kantian principles. Likewise, psychopaths are not pulled it when violating what we see as basic rights because they are not buying into the belief that people have such rights. I obviously disagree, but hopefully you get the point.
Now, there is a difference between being morally responsible and holding one morally responsible. I think we can hold them morally responsible because they are morally responsible. But, that said, I agree that having a switch (for empathy) doesn’t exculpate them.
Lastly, I am in agreement with you once again in your final para. There is a cognitive component to morality and though it’s not an end all be all it’s enough to get blame off the ground (IMHO).
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Justin Caouette
January 20, 2015
Lage, I don’t think that we need to specify the axioms in order to get the conversation going. But I agree that what one has to say about morality will likely affect the intuitions one has about the psychopath.
You say: “I think that you make a good point by mentioning that empathy may not be the ONLY emotion or faculty bearing on our ethical perception, but it is likely the primary and necessary one and often drives other emotions in the process”.
Why think this is so? And what do you have in mind by empathy “…often drives other emotions in the process”?
Lastly, a suggestion: Paul Bloom has done some great work in the popular press recently on empathy, I think you might find his view, which is the polar opposite of the one you seem to be suggesting, interesting. It’s not surprise that I find his work on this pretty good, to say the least.
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Lage
January 21, 2015
“Lage, I don’t think that we need to specify the axioms in order to get the conversation going. But I agree that what one has to say about morality will likely affect the intuitions one has about the psychopath. ”
I believe it is reasonable to say that in order to determine what moral responsibility is, and whether or not a being has moral responsibility, one must first define the morality that these terms are dependent on. Defining morality seems to involve starting with certain moral axioms, if the morality is to be anything that is consistent, and if it is to have a solid foundation to build other ideas upon. To illustrate this, we can see that by simply modifying the intuitive definition of morality to be something that the psychopath DOES or follows, and such that he does have moral responsibility and is morally responsible, despite his or her actions, we can see the importance of the starting axioms and assumptions, since they can be changed to completely alter the semantic content that we’re after in this discussion. I argue that the most intuitive moral axiom is based on empathy, because there isn’t any other emotional driving force that is as primary or that accomplishes a moral framework that cares about the feelings of others, through a biological mirroring of another’s emotional state. That is, empathy allows us to use our own experience, the only frame of reference we have, to project another’s experience into our own minds, making it as real and as meaningful as anything can be experientially.
“You say: “I think that you make a good point by mentioning that empathy may not be the ONLY emotion or faculty bearing on our ethical perception, but it is likely the primary and necessary one and often drives other emotions in the process”. Why think this is so? And what do you have in mind by empathy “…often drives other emotions in the process”? ”
I think it is evident by our feelings and intuitions in any “moral predicament” that we face. We seem to ultimately care about what people do to others, and what we do to others BECAUSE we realize or strongly believe (and with empirical justification) that those other people have feelings like we do, and that understanding guides our behavior to mimic or produce our own pleasurable experiences and states of well being in those other people. By empathy driving other emotions, I mean for example, if I see the cat being burned alive, my empathy for that cat and its experience of pain may produce rage or anger in me regarding the people doing it. My empathy may drive me to be sad or depressed by my understanding of how miserable that experience for the cat may be, or feeling helpless that I live in a world where people could do such a thing. There are countless examples of how my empathy would naturally lead to other emotions as a consequence of my understanding that other being’s experiences and putting myself in the shoes of that other being. Thus, it seems to me that empathy is sort of an overarching fundamental emotional driving force for our moral intuitions and ethical perception that can often produce or mediate other emotions as well. By empathy producing those other emotions, that may increase the impulse or incentive for my response in stopping that ill behavior if I’m able to (so it also makes evolutionary sense). For example, if I’m angry at those performing the act, their observation of my anger may deter them, or my anger may drive me to stop them more aggressively and effectively.
“Lastly, a suggestion: Paul Bloom has done some great work in the popular press recently on empathy, I think you might find his view, which is the polar opposite of the one you seem to be suggesting, interesting. It’s not surprise that I find his work on this pretty good, to say the least.”
I’ll take a look at Bloom’s work, but what I’ve read so far is disappointing. I disagree that his view is the polar opposite from mine, and I’ll add that he shares some of my views regarding how empathy induces compassion and so forth. Where I see Bloom fail is that he doesn’t seem to appreciate the fact that empathy isn’t an all or none approach. That is, empathy can work in concert with other faculties, but just because other faculties are involved in a behavior outcome doesn’t negate empathy or mean they aren’t emotionally-based or driven by empathy.
Another thing he mentions, for example (http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy) is that:
“It is worth expanding on the difference between empathy and compassion, because some of empathy’s biggest fans are confused on this point and think that the only force that can motivate kindness is empathetic arousal. But this is mistaken. Imagine that the child of a close friend has drowned. A highly empathetic response would be to feel what your friend feels, to experience, as much as you can, the terrible sorrow and pain. In contrast, compassion involves concern and love for your friend, and the desire and motivation to help, but it need not involve mirroring your friend’s anguish.”
While a true mirroring or 100% mirroring of the friend’s anguish isn’t necessary, I’d argue that SOME mirroring is. That is, it doesn’t have to be a HIGHLY empathetic response, but merely SOME empathetic response. Furthermore, I’d argue that compassion is rooted in empathy, as is the concern and love for the friend mentioned. There are other reasoning faculties that also allow us to appreciate the state of affairs, but in any case, any kind of altruism displayed again seems to be ultimately rooted or driven by empathy — a concern and understanding of others feelings and experiences. Thus Bloom here at least, seems to be changing the definition of empathy, or perhaps defining empathy to be something other than that which motivates or produces love and concern for a friend — instead he seems to be looking at empathy in an isolated sense, not realizing that it works in concert with a host of other things, including the cultural context I mentioned in my first comment, and applying our empathy on different levels of understanding in any given situation. Empathy is broader than Bloom seems to suggest, and isn’t something that can simply be isolated from compassion, concern, or love. All of those things are rooted in empathy, even if empathy isn’t applied in exactly the same way in every circumstance. Bloom admirably points out how empathy can cause problems in people’s behaviors, but it seems that the bulk of the problem lies with the lack of OTHER faculties that are required to balance empathy or utilize it in a way that is most advantageous for the person. That is why we pit our brains against our biological shortcomings so often. To use an analogy, just because too much mortar will cause a structure to collapse or not be built properly, doesn’t mean that one should then get rid of the mortar altogether or discount its necessity in the building process. Rather it is using the required mortar (empathy) in the right amounts or by being balanced appropriately with other building materials (e.g. reason and rationality) to get an optimized outcome.
Bloom goes on to say: “Or consider long-distance charity. It is conceivable, I suppose, that someone who hears about the plight of starving children might actually go through the empathetic exercise of imagining what it is like to starve to death. But this empathetic distress surely isn’t necessary for charitable giving. A compassionate person might value others’ lives in the abstract, and, recognizing the misery caused by starvation, be motivated to act accordingly. Summing up, compassionate helping is good for you and for others. But empathetic distress is destructive of the individual in the long run. ”
I agree with Bloom that empathetic distress is not desirable, but again, that doesn’t mean get rid of the mortar (previous analogy). It means that one can’t use too much, or without a proper balance of other faculties working in concert WITH that empathy. I think the primary disagreement here lies with how empathy is being defined, or how it is to be applied in each individual. The empathetic arousal or distress for example may have some negative consequences, but remember that empathy is ultimately:
“…the experience of understanding another person’s condition from their perspective. You place yourself in their shoes and feel what they are feeling.”
This can be accomplished in degrees, just as moral responsibility, mentioned in a previous post. Empathy isn’t an all or none emotional force. By having any level of understanding another person’s condition from their perspective, one is exercising empathy, and this can be healthily balanced with other complementary faculties such as reason — which includes knowing or learning what kinds of behaviors can help reduce another person’s suffering. But they are ultimately starting with empathy and simply applying it more effectively with those other faculties. So, THAT it is present and a necessary foundation for any kind of care, love, or compassion toward another in distress seems quite obvious to me, even if there are less healthy degrees of empathic response or distress that can result due to a lack of balance or application of other faculties. This is exactly what I would expect from an evolutionary evolved trait. It works well, but it isn’t perfect and our other faculties of reason and rationality also need to be applied to optimize the final result. In any case, empathy appears to be quite advantageous and was naturally selected for those advantages. Empathy appears to be a fundamental driving force for all morality, even though it isn’t the only force, and is not a force that works in isolation. Once I know what it feels like to be hungry, I can easily empathize with starving people and help them. However, once I realize this concept, I don’t need to have an empathic resonance with people that live thousands of miles away to send them money or food. This is where I would use other rational reasoning faculties to infer that the same rules apply for all people, regardless of where they are or whether or not I choose to employ a large degree of “empathic distress” to feel their hunger. Once a person knows or has a fairly good idea of what it would feel like to be in a certain situation, one no longer HAS to employ that same level of resonance to achieve the same effect. However, if nobody had empathy to start with, a realization of other’s feeling pain and appreciating the desire to reduce it, then what fundamental or instinctual motivation would I have to help them, that isn’t simply a learned behavior of what society desires? Empathy seems to be the root of it all, and after it is exercised to even a small degree, the reasoning and rationale of the human mind can do the rest.
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angramainyu2014
January 21, 2015
Justin,
Thanks for the thoughtful reply as well.
On the issue of moral responsibility, I agree there is a difference between being morally responsible and holding one morally responsible; sorry if that wasn’t clear. If A holds B morally responsible for something B does, B might or might not be morally responsible.
What I was trying to get at is that usually, it seems to me people say that they hold someone morally responsible for their actions (more precisely, for some specific action), they mean that the action was morally wrong. But I would add it seems also common that someone would say (e.g.) that another person is responsible for the safety of soem children, or a plane, etc., meaning that they have a moral obligation to ensure (without certain limits) the safety in question (but they probably would just say “responsible”, rather than “morally responsible”).
At any rate, FWIW, I think in the case of psychopaths, the key issue is whether they are blameworthy (and how much), – which I believe they are, and how much depends on the case by psychopathy doesn’t reduce the degree -, which I consider equivalent (but I get that many people disagree) to the issue of whether their behavior is morally wrong/immoral (and how much).
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ejwinner
January 21, 2015
I confess I am not convinced that any emotion is required for ethical behavior; this is one of the reasons I am suspicious that ‘human sympathy’ can be discovered as the basis for it, as some naturalists have been claiming since Hume. Humans have much same same basic motivations as other animals, but the methodology for shaping that behavior is very different than those employed by other animals.
In judging ethical – or unethical -, then, it is best to look first to the act itself; then, before judging the actor, we should judge our own motivations. Is it revenge? outrage? fear? Or can I be honestly guided by a principle of the best interests of the community.
Depending on the nature of the impulses involved, I would say that in general, no, psychotic transgressors cannot be held morally responsible in the sense of deserving blame. They cannot even control their thoughts, how can we say they controlled their actions?
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Lage
January 22, 2015
“I confess I am not convinced that any emotion is required for ethical behavior; this is one of the reasons I am suspicious that ‘human sympathy’ can be discovered as the basis for it, as some naturalists have been claiming since Hume. Humans have much same same basic motivations as other animals, but the methodology for shaping that behavior is very different than those employed by other animals. ”
I don’t think that any emotion is required for ethical behavior per se, as people can simply learn that certain things are considered “ethical” and be taught how to conduct themselves within certain guidelines. However, without any emotions driving the behavior, they aren’t as powerfully motivated to maintain that ethical behavior, and thus people without this emotional driving force are going to be far more likely to be vulnerable in learning behaviors that aren’t ethical, because they have no innate predispositions guiding the adoption of those learned behaviors. So I don’t believe any emotion is required per se, but it is required in order to have an “instinctual” sense of morality, e.g., one that involves altruism and the consideration of others. Thus, a person that doesn’t have empathy (or doesn’t apply it in the right way due to other faculties overcoming it or knocking it out of balance) is more likely than an average, healthy person, to adopt morally reprehensible behaviors. Again, I can teach a robot to perform “ethical” behavior, but it can just as easily be programmed to perform “non-ethical” behavior, because there isn’t some fundamental underlying emotional component that has been evolutionarily engrained in the robot to help guide it in a moral direction. That is, there is no innate morality in a traditional simple robot. Since humans are a more complicated type of robot (a biological robot no less) that does have innate hardware configurations that predispose what we call “morality” or “moral behavior” (unlike a traditional robot that starts off as a more or less “blank slate”), humans aren’t blank slates (as Pinker and others have pointed out), and thus while we can be programmed in a number of ways, there are programming options that will conflict with innate drives and thus are less likely to be realized in human beings.
Empathy, I argue, is one of those innate drives that provides a biological basis for morality — a starting point that humans likely employ even in ever more complex ways after some level of reason and rationality integrate that empathy with new knowledge we learn about how to treat others ethically. If psychopaths lack this empathy (or lack the proper ability to implement it with other faculties in the proper balance), then we can see how they would lack a biological basis (or lack some amount of it relative to normal individuals) an innate emotional driving force to fall back on for any kind of “moral” inclination at all. Without that hardware-driven inclination, they are more like simplistic robots that can be programmed in more dangerous ways, or not easily (if at all) programmed in less dangerous ways. Thus, they lack moral responsibility (or at least lack more of it) than “normal”, healthy human beings would. It seems that they must have a different degree of responsibility if nothing else, but in the grand scheme of things, without any classical free will anyway, what we are really talking about is not whether a psychopath has free will or not (since nobody does), but rather we are discussing the LEVEL of constraint in decision making processes and behaviors that ensue. Certainly psychopaths have a higher level of constraint that limits their behaviors and how easily they can be changed.
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Joe
January 27, 2015
I think this topic is quite interesting. I think the psychopath presents an interesting case. Although it’s hard to talk about because psychopathy is not entirely understood, as are what factors are relevant to moral responsibility. I could probably spell out my views in several blogs on this but let me give just a skeleton here.
First it seems like psychopathy has been identified by people who make comments or display behaviors that reveal a complete lack of empathy, guilt, remorse that normal people tend to feel. Psychologists noticed this and then tried to identify certain criteria that can be measured and that helps identify these people. But we shouldn’t start to define the condition by the criteria that we can measure, or we may end up with a moving target.
Let me explain. We can get data of a persons empathy by mris of brain activity when people are shown pictures that cause most people feel empathy. And lack of empathy is a recognized trait of psychopathy.
But lack of remorse is another aspect. IMO a more important one. We can’t really measure lack of remorse in the same way, because when we feel remorse it does not happen at set times when we are set up to an MRI. Also because remorse is caused by *us* doing something wrong, its hard to simply show an imagery of others doing wrong to make us feel remorse. (perhaps with virtual reality type games? But that might have ethical issues – I haven’t thought much about it.)
So what if some people who lack empathy still might have strong feeling of remorse? IMO they are not necessarily a psychopath. In fact I would argue that the lack of remorse might be the more important emotion.
Now those are 2 emotive states that correlate with moral judgments in most people. But there are others. Just off the cuff I can think of several cognitive reactions that may or may not come into play when we think of morally evil situations. We have 1) empathy, 2)disgust, 3)motivation (whether directly or indirectly after combined with a desire – I don’t mean to get into Hume), 4) a sense of urgency that something is wrong, 5)remorse 6) guilt and 7)shame from loss of reputation. These are just for purposes of illustration and not meant as a limitation of other cognitive states.
Now remorse might properly be considered a form of shame. Shame seems broader. It might be personal shame that you can feel alone even if no one else is aware of your evil act or it can be something you feel because others are made aware of your evil act. The former would be remorse and the latter is more of a loss of reputation. I think it is worth separating the 2.
I also separate guilt and remorse. Remorse might be more of an emotional sense. Guilt is an understanding that what you did is wrong. It seems at least plausible that a psychopath can recognize they are guilty but not feel remorse. This is somewhat murky though.
Now for each of these (or others that we might think of) we might ask:
A) does the psychopath lack this or have a diminished capacity for this?
And if so
then
B) What impact on his culpability (or praiseworthiness) does this have.
I also think its interesting to ask this:
C) is this cognitive state and emotional state, or the product of reason, or something else.
Now as to question A) I would say yes the psychopath has at least diminished capacities for 1,2,5. I don’t think they have any diminished capacity for 3. As for 4, 6 and 7 I think it is complicated and needs some sorting out.
As for question B) I think the diminished capacities for 1 and 2 do diminish the psychopaths culpability relative to ours. Let me explain a bit by quoting an explanation from the article cited by Angra:
“For most of us, seeing someone get hurt triggers vicarious activity in pain areas. This vicarious pain gives us an ‘egoistic’ reason to refrain from antisocial behaviour; do not hurt others because it (vicariously) hurts you (Miller and Eisenberg, 1988). In psychopathy, reduced somatosensory, insula and anterior cingulate vicarious activations could disinhibit antisocial behaviour.
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/136/8/2550.full?ijkey=CqWen0GPOBYJVDY&keytype=ref
So to the extent this plausible explanation holds, then empathy does not so much instruct us about morals as it keeps us in line. If we step out of line we get vicarious pain. I am not of the view that just because an action is self-serving it is necessarily wrong. On the other hand I do think that if an action is self-serving it can mitigate the praiseworthiness. We tend to praise people who clean the roadway as volunteers more than those who do it for a paycheck. I think a similar logic applies here. To the extent we do not attack others so we can avoid vicarious pain it seems our refraining from an attack is less praiseworthy than someone who refrains from it even though they have no such self-serving motive.
I can’t go through an analysis of all these traits now. But I do think for example avoiding remorse and disgust would morally diminish our relative praiseworthiness. But the issue of guilty conscience is somewhat different. Unlike emotions that are only secondary to moral judgments I think developing a conscience (which may find us guilty) is something we are morally required to do. To say I am less culpable because I never developed my conscious and sense of guilt is not IMO a mitigating circumstance.
One further quick point. This may raise an issue of whether psychopaths should be treated differently under the law for committing crimes. I think the analysis here is to look at the reasons we have punishments for crimes. And I would offer 3 of them. 1)Retribution 2)deterrence and 3) rehabilitation.
It seems to me that a psychopath presumably through no fault of his own does not have the emotions that help keep us in line. This to some extent may mitigate his culpability. So to that extent the retributive purpose of the punishment would suggest a lighter punishment. However, I think this is directly counteracted by the deterrent purpose of the law. Indeed they are deemed less culpable at best because they do not have the other mechanisms in place that deter crime like we do. Therefore in order to deter them from committing crimes the punishment must be kept more severe.
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