CFA: Workshop on the Epistemic Dimension of Moral Responsibility

Posted on November 11, 2014 by


This looks to be an excellent workshop! I will be submitting an abstract.

Find the Workshop info here. For a summary of the workshop see below.

Workshop 2015

Responsibility – The Epistemic Dimension II

When: May 12-13 2015
Where: VU University Amsterdam

It is generally agreed that moral responsibility has an epistemic dimension. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. For this second workshop in the series, we welcome submissions on the following issues (and related ones):

(1) Does the epistemic condition require awareness or akrasia?
(2) Should the epistemic condition be analysed in terms of quality-of-will?
(3) Does tracing apply to the epistemic condition?
(4) Is the epistemic condition sensitive to luck?
(5) Does moral, as opposed to factual, ignorance excuse?
(6) Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty?
(7) Does the epistemic condition involve norms of inquiry rather than belief?
(8) Is the epistemic condition independent from the control condition?

Invited speakers
George Sher, Rice University, author of ‘Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness’
Nomy Arpaly, Brown University, co-author of ‘In Praise of Desire’

For last year’s line-up: see here.

Call for papers
Please send a 300-words abstract to here by Feb 1 2015. All contributed sessions will be one hour and mostly consist of discussion (as all papers will be pre-read and have a commentator).

Call for commentators and lightning talks
Please let us know if you’d like to join as a commentator. In addition, young scholars are invited to submit a 300-words abstract for a lightning talk.

Organizers
Jan Willem Wieland & Philip Robichaud

Support
NWO Veni project ‘We should know better’
VU TF section, led by René van Woudenberg
VU PF section, led by Martin van Hees
OZSW study group ‘Philosophy of responsibility’