Incompatibilism, for our purposes here, is the view that the sort free will required for moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism. In a few recent studies there seems to be an apparent disconnect between incompatibilist intuitions when asked compatibility questions in a different way. On the one hand, in abstract cases the folk seem to be incompatibilist. However, in concrete cases, such intuitions seem to be compatibilist. Abstract cases are cases in which the folk are not given details about specific moral failings, rather, they are given the facts of the universe and are asked a question about the moral responsibility of agents in that world. Concrete cases are cases that are given with details of moral failings. In these latter cases it seems that the folk intuition is that moral responsibility, or the freedom required to ground moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. So, what’s causing the difference?
In a very nice paper, Gunnar Björnsson argues that the “explanation hypothesis” is better equipped than the “bypass hypothesis” offered by Eddie Nahmias and Dylan Murray to handle the inconsistent intuitions incompatibilists seem to have. The explanation hypothesis claims that “subjects’ tendencies to withhold responsibility attributions to agents in deterministic scenarios do not stem from tendencies to understand determinism as implying bypassed agency. Instead, bypass intuitions are explained by intuitions of undermined responsibility, or, as I have suggested, by a condition closely associated with those intuitions.” (pg 20).
Now, rather than get into the details of both views or declare one side a victor over the other I would like to pose a few questions about the explanatory hypothesis for those in the know. Bjornsson amd Perrson claim:
“In earlier work, Karl Persson and I have argued that a certain independently supported general account of responsibility judgments gives us reason to disregard the basic intuitions grounding incompatibilist or skeptical convictions (Björnsson 2011, Björnsson and Persson 2009,2012, 2013). According to this account, the attributions of responsibility are implicit explanatory judgments, understanding the object of responsibility as straightforwardly explained by the agent’s motivational structures. Incompatibilist intuitions arise from shifts in salient explanatory models, shifts that, we argue, are predictable but epistemically weightless side effects of mechanisms the function of which is to keep track of mundane relations between agents and outcomes.”
But, why think this is so? Why reject the first set of intuitions rather than the second? I think it would be plausible to reject the second set of intuitions, the intuitions brought out by concrete cases for biological and evolutionary reasons. For instance, if we attempted to replicate Björnsson’s study but slightly altered the questions I think we could get different results. Instead of asking,”Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?” as they did in their first study, we could ask “Is Bill as much to blame for killing his wife and kids as he would be in Universe B?” One reason we could give to speak to the answers given the way the question was asked in the first instance could be that the folk responds in disgust, or something like it, when a wrong-doer is not held accountable for their actions. This could be the cause of why their intuition shifts. Here’s a short podcast where Savulescu discusses the “Yuk factor” . To tell if this is the cause we could change the question a bit to secure the fact that the wrongdoer is still to blame but not as much, as suggested above. If it turned out that the wrongdoer is thought not to be *as morally responsible* as the wrongdoer from Universe A then we seem to save the initial intution and the inconsistency seems to go away. We can also explain the difference in intuitions via the “yuk factor” or some variation of it. If this is true then the conclusion drawn by Björnsson and Persson might be misplaced. Rather than concluding that “attributions of responsibility are implicit explanatory judgments, understanding the object of responsibility as straightforwardly explained by the agent’s motivational structures” we could conclude that attributions of responsibility do track a more metaphysical account of the world. Since many already seem to have incompatibilist intuitions in abstract cases, and, if the results of the newly asked question do track that agents involved in the concrete cases are less to blame in Universe A rather than Universe B, then the intuition from the first cases would not seem so arbitrary.
So, in conclusion, the cause of what looks to be a difference in intuitions could be a variation of what Julian Savulescu dubbed the “yuk factor”. I don’t think it would necessarily flip flop the results but I do think it would bring the results more in line with the incompatibilist intuitions folks have in the initial abstract case. Think about it for a second, in the first abstract cases the “yuk factor” is not activated so to speak. The idea is that people have reactive attitudes of disgust when they hear about adverse situations. It’s biological and evolutionary in nature. But, once we place a victim and a horrific crime in the mix (as in the concrete case) the “yuk factor” comes in to skew the results. Sounds plausible at least. If we ran the study we would at least be able to gauge if in fact the intuitions are inconsistent or if there was something else at play doing the work (the yuk factor?).
Thoughts?
Justin Caouette
December 21, 2013
There seems to be a problem with the comments. If you are having problems posting a comment please email me via aphilosopherstake@gmail.com
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Landbeyond
December 21, 2013
It doesn’t take papers and studies to grasp that the “yuk factor” is a matter of emotion – “biological and evolutionary in nature”. The same goes for intuitions in general. Serious assessment of responsibility must be objective. I don’t see what the issue is.
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Justin Caouette
December 23, 2013
Prof. Gunnar Björnsson tried to leave a comment but for some reason was not able to. He was kind enough to email me his comment, so here it is (below).
“Hi Justin, thanks for the plug, and for raising a good question.
A couple of quick comments:
You asked: “Why reject the first set of intuitions rather than the second?”
If this question is asked on the assumption that the Explanation Hypothesis is correct, we are outlining some reasons (of both epistemic and metasemantic nature) towards the end of Björnsson & Persson 2012. Without that assumption, we need to take into account a wider range of evidence. The way I see it, the EH interpretation of the abstract/concrete phenomenon has considerable independent support from EH’s capacity to account for a wide variety of other phenomena (as discussed in the papers cited above).
Still, the suggestion that emotional reactions to concrete wrongdoing is doing the work is antecedently and independently plausible, as typical examples of abstract / concrete cases are likely to have different emotional oomph. Indeed, in their 2007 paper, Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe made a proposal along those lines, though not one taking disgust to be the operative definition. (I haven’t thought enough about whether differences between disgust and anger would yield straightforwardly different predictions in combination with an emotion-based account of abstract/concrete differences, or whether an emotion based account should countenance roles played by more than one sort of emotion in these cases.) In this context, it might be worth to look at Florian Cova’s work. He argues against this proposal in “Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists”, and have (I think) done further work on the supposed involvement of emotions in compatibilist judgments. Those wanting to look closer at this issue would probably want to have a look.
(One should perhaps note, as Nichols and Knobe do, that even on an emotional account of the abstract/concrete effect, some argument is needed for the conclusion that the compatibilist intuition is in error. On the contrary, one might think that emotional guidance is part of basic capacities of moral cognition. Nevertheless, I think that the emotional account, if it can be made to work, is one of the more promising grounds for an error theory about compatibilist intuitions.)
Regarding the proposal to ask subjects to compare the agent’s moral responsibility in the deterministic and indeterministic universes: I’m not sure that it would distinguish predictions made by EH and predictions made by the emotion hypothesis. The contrastive question is one that highlights determinism, and so highlights the abstract explanatory frame that EH takes to be responsible for rejections of responsibility in deterministic cases. A different sort of variation would be needed, I would think.”
Hopefully, everyone’s ability to comment is working again. I spoke briefly with wordpress and assured me that all is in working order.
Thanks to Gunnar for the interesting comments. I hope to post a reply soon.
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trasloco internazionale
September 14, 2014
Hello! Would you mind if I share your blog with my
facebook group? There’s a lot of people that I think would really appreciate
your content. Please let me know. Many thanks
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Justin Caouette
September 14, 2014
Share away!
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