I have argued in the past that Sam Harris needs to read more philosophy. I have said this because Harris, in his book “Free Will“, failed to respond to compatibilist criticisms to the view he was arguing for, criticisms that have been around for quite some time. Harris’ arguments attempt to prove the thesis that we lacked the sort of free will necessary for desert-based moral responsibility. I stand by my claim. The free will problem was not solved by Harris, nor has it been since the release of his book. In this article I will not be arguing for or against the view that we have free will, rather, I would like to call into question some new claims made by Harris. He has recently argued that hatred and the reactive attitudes associated with blame (i.e. resentment, indignation) are not appropriate in our world because we lack free will. Free will grounds “true hatred” according to Harris because “[such] hatred requires that we view our enemy as the ultimate author of his thoughts and actions”. To be the “ultimate author” of our actions is another way of saying that we must be free to act with respect to the act in question but also that we are free from refraining to act as such. Though I disagree that we have sufficient proof to deny such authorship, I will grant that we do not for the remainder of this post. I will also assume, for the sake of argument, that Harris is correct about hatred. It is never appropriate to hate another because the appropriateness of hatred depends on us having the free will that Harris denies. I grant these points in an effort to show an inconsistency in Harris’ view. To see this we must look briefly at some of the remarks he made regarding another moral emotion or attitude, love.
Harris has claimed that “seeing through the illusion of free will does not undercut the reality of love”. A lack of free will does not make love inappropriate because, according to Harris, “loving other people is not a matter of fixating on the underlying causes of their behavior”. To be clear, Harris is claiming that on the one hand hatred requires that a certain metaphysical position hold: that the agent we hate be the ultimate author of her actions, that she has basic-desert moral responsibility for her actions. On the other hand Harris is claiming that love, unlike hatred, does not require that the beloved is the ultimate author of her actions: the object of our love need not have free will. Here is the source of my disagreement with Harris (and philosophers like Derk Pereboom who claim that life without a belief free will would likely be better). Though Harris might be right that certain kinds of love do not require free will or morally responsible agency for them to be appropriate, one important kind of love seems to, mainly, “the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other”. Let’s call this kind of love reciprocal love. Arguably, this love is the love we share in our most cherished relationships. Recently, Justin Coates has argued, that such a love has an essential connection to moral responsibility. I agree with Coates and you can find his argument here. I also have independent arguments for the claim that reciprocal love requires that the agents involved have basic-desert grounding moral responsibility which itself requires the sort of free will that Harris denies. My arguments will be forthcoming in my dissertation, chapter 4 as it were.
For the remainder of this post I would like to pose some motivations for thinking that such love, reciprocal love, requires that the agents involved be morally responsible agents, that they have basic-desert moral responsibility. Now, to be clear, there are other kinds of love such as paternal love that may or may not require such free will. For now, let’s bracket the love one has for their new born child. I want to focus on reciprocal love, the love we share with our spouses or partners and our closest friendships,
Harris claims that the love we share in the above mentioned relationships would not be affected if it turned out that the agents involved did not have free will. To put a little pressure on this claim I’d like you to consider just few points:
(i) Harris claims ” [we] don’t hate storms, avalanches, mosquitoes, or flu. We might use the term “hatred” to describe our aversion to the suffering these things cause us—but we are prone to hate other human beings in a very different sense”. I’d like to say that we can the same thing about love. We may love ‘Breaking Bad’ or ‘the Wire’ and we use the term “love” to describe our penchant for the joy we get while watching these shows—but we are prone to love other adult human beings in a very different sense. The relationships that give rise to the reciprocal love we have for another seem to be adequately described by Tim Scanlon (1998) and others as relationships of mutual regard. Such relationships seem to involve shared expectations and obligations. But, as I have argued before, these sorts of obligations (understood as “wider scope moral obligations”) themselves require the sort of free will denied by Sam Harris. If this is true then via transitivity we could argue that such relationships could not be maintained, or at best would be damaged. This is so because such obligations seem to play a necessary role in maintaining the reciprocal loving relationship.
(ii) If it turned out that your loved one only loved you because they had no other live option to love someone else would this change your relationship? There is empirical data suggesting that a belief in a world lacking agents with free will negatively affects people’s ethical behavior. Why think that such a belief would not negatively affect the way you understand the dynamic of your loving relationships?
(iii) If it turned out that your beloved only loved you because they were manipulated by a neuroscientist to do so (assume the scientist planted a chip into the head of the person claiming to love you and THAT chip was foundation of the love you share) would you feel that the love shared was generic or inauthentic in any way? If so, how is a determined universe different in any meaningful way than the neuroscientist?
At the end of the day it at least seems plausible to assume that reciprocal loving relationships implicitly assume morally responsible agency of the basic-desert variety. If this assumption can be instantiated then it would follow that Harris would be wrong once again. Love, at least one important variety of it, seems to involve free will. The sort of free will that assumes “ultimate authorship”
-Justin
References
Coates, D.J. 2013. “In Defense of Love Internalism”, The Journal of Ethics.
Harris, Sam. 2012. Free Will. Free Press: New York.
Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambride University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A Philosopher's Take 
Bob
October 4, 2013
” I’d like to say that we can [say?] the same thing about love.” I think you are right in your discussion of reciprocal loving relationships.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 7, 2013
Thanks, Bob.
LikeLike
Clare Flourish
October 4, 2013
We are beings which respond in complex ways to complex stimuli, but like microbes we respond from what we are, how that changing object in this moment responds. It feels like we have choices, but we see those choices and what is the better response from who we are, and if we respond in some other way than the rational part of ourselves thinks is “best” that also comes from who we are.
(I am a determinist.)
If someone without free will wrongs me, and I (also without free will, but with some reading of popularised Buddhism) feel, accept, articulate and then pass through my anger and hatred, then I can respond to him more in my interests, though still not with free will.
If I am in love with a partner, and with whatever Wisdom I have managed to acquire seek her interests and cherish her, and cultivate our mutual love, that seems a good response, based on the reading I have done, which is part of the complex stimuli which dictate my actions.
If a chip made her love me, then I could treat her abominably.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 7, 2013
I am not seeing a difference between a determined Universe or a chip. Both disallow any choice. If you think you can treat her “abominably” in the chip scenario what should stop you in the deterministic scenario. After all, a chip scenario is a deterministic scenario…
LikeLiked by 1 person
Malcolm Greenhill
October 4, 2013
Thank you. Interesting argument, but the fact that I know my brain is riddled with cognitive biases does not prevent me from deluding myself that they don’t exist and continuing to make ‘biased’ decisions. Romantic love is famously ‘blind’ so possibly, if I found out that my romantic partner only loved me because of a chip in her head, I might just find a way to convince myself that this didn’t matter and continue to behave as if I was not aware of this.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 7, 2013
I am not making a claim about what you can or cannot do in a deterministic universe (or an indeterministic universe that rules out free will). I agree that you might convince yourself that the chip might not matter. But, in the anger cases, people sometimes convince themselves that they should hold onto the resentment when it was not the person’s fault. We often see those holding onto the resentment as confused or inappropriate. I am suggesting there is no difference, or at least no significant difference in the love scenarios.
LikeLike
Landbeyond
October 6, 2013
“At the end of the day it at least seems plausible to assume that reciprocal loving relationships implicitly assume morally responsible agency of the basic-desert variety.”
That assumption would imply that reciprocal loving relationships between individuals who consciously reject the concept of free will not only should not, but do not exist in the real world. Can you honestly make that claim?
The “chip in the head” scenario introduces an artificial element into the situation such that it is no longer the kind of reciprocal loving relationship for which evolution has programmed us. The chip will, in your terms, differ in a meaningful way from the still-present context of a determined universe.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 7, 2013
To your first question: I don’t have to claim that. I can admit that these relationships that you bring up do in fact exist but only that those who have disavowed desert based moral responsibility while holding those views are being irrational. One must give up either hard incompatibilism or the grounds on which their love is based. One could still love but such a love cannot be grounded on any notion resembling desert (I’d love to here how such a love would be grounded–most of the contemporary literature suggests obligations of love–i.e. Susan Wolf, Kolodny, Velleman). And, if reciprocal relationships, are either based on mutual or are sustained by such obligations then it is hard to see how such relationships could be rationally sustained.
To your second point: why is the chip different in any meaningful way? It’s a deterministic scenario just like determinism. It seems to be a local case whereas determinism is usually understood as universal.
LikeLike
Landbeyond
October 9, 2013
“I can admit that these relationships that you bring up do in fact exist but only that those who have disavowed desert based moral responsibility while holding those views are being irrational.”
If by “those views” you mean reciprocal loving relationships, they don’t need to be based on rationality, as they about emotions. Hatred on the part of an individual who has disavowed desert-based moral responsibility for someone who has done something bad would also be based on emotion. Neither is rational, so what is the difference?
Clearly, there are no rational grounds for such hatred, and so, given opportunity for reflection, and if rationality is not overwhelmed by emotion, the negative attitude of hatred, or at least the blame and desire for retribution underlying it, is not justified, is not just, and cannot be sustained.
In the case of reciprocal love, there is no negative attitude to be justified, and the positive emotions are being continually mutually renewed and reinforced. Each of the two individuals knows, intellectually, that the other doesn’t deserve the love he or she feels, but they feel it anyway.
“why is the chip different in any meaningful way?”
As I explained, it is an artificial, “Stepford spouse” situation. Yes, it is a “deterministic scenario”, but not not one for which we are “designed”.
It seems that you are trying to impose logic on a situation where emotion is the essential element.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 9, 2013
To your first point: I agree that initial emotional reactions are not rational, they just arise so-to-speak. (For the moment I’ll bracket my worry that everything would seem to just “arise” if hard incompatibilism were true.) But, what rational folks tend to do is to access these emotional responses. If the emotional response seems fitting this is acknowledged and we often act in accordance. So, I may become mad if someone rear-ends me in the parking lot, but, if the person that rear-ended me had a seizure at the wheel it would seem that my anger directed at them would be unfitting. On the other hand if I was rear-ended because the driver was on her cell phone then the anger or resentment directed at the driver seems fitting. So, the analysis comes at the second stage of emotional response, not the first. And, this is where rationality comes into play, when we choose to direct our emotions. I can give a similar scenario to a loving situation.
To your second point, I think you are just wrong to say there is “no negative attitude to be justified”. Sometimes it is quite harmful to love someone else, these harms carry negativity. They may be abusive and mistreating. To continue loving a person that continuously treats you like this seems inappropriate. They do not seem worthy of the lovers love.
Regarding your response, or reiteration of the relevance of the chip: I am still perplexed. What are we “designed” for? Please enlighten me. If determinism is true and a chip being planted in my lovers head was inevitable going back to the big bang how was the chip not part of the design story? It’s just as “designed” and as historical as the evolutionary traits we come to have.
I should also point out that you seem to be doing the same thing you accuse me of when you speak of anger, retribution, and blame. I am just trying to show that the criticism of emotional response can cut both ways if one is committed to hard incompatibilism. Appealing to what we are designed for seems like a weak response. To be charitable, that response at least requires some argument.
Lastly, there is my bracketed worry. If this is true (that everything would seem to just arise if hard incompatibilism were true) then in what way can we give weight to any assessment whatsoever? The assessment itself would be determined and the weighting in favor of or against any assessment would seem to be futile. The only thing that could mediate conflicting assessments would be an appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions for the assessment in question to be appropriate. I am arguing that a necessary condition for at least *some* reactive attitudes to be appropriate is desert-based moral responsibility which requires a source understanding of free will. I have yet to hear an argument, or even support for an argument that claims such attitudes do not require free will. I have heard and read some assertions such as “they feel it anyway” which is supposed to lend support to the claim that it *is* appropriate to continue feeling that emotion. Your comments regarding anger lend support to view that emotions can and can’t be rational once they have hit the reflective stage. The argument that such attitudes cannot be assessed for appropriateness seems quite thin, if there is an argument there at all.
LikeLike
Landbeyond
October 10, 2013
Your first paragraph describes your own compatibilist position (in fact, I find it hard to distinguish your reaction in the given scenario from a simple assumption of free will and moral responsibility).
Since your original post states very clearly that you are talking about “the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other”, the question of being “abusive and mistreating” is not relevant.
Regarding the chip, I am not sure how much clearer I can make it. We have evolved as social creatures. One aspect of how we relate to one another is, in your words, “the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other”. I think we can agree that such love manifests itself frequently, and is natural in our species. “A chip being planted in my lover’s head” is not natural in our species, making true “reciprocal love” impossible and making it less likely that the chip-free partner will experience the same emotion of love, despite the emotions experienced by the chipped partner being involuntary in both cases. We are human beings: we haven’t evolved with that kind of chip in our heads, and don’t have the brain chemistry that makes it natural to respond to someone who we know has such a chip as we might to someone who does not. (Obviously I was not using the term “designed” in a literal sense.)
“I am just trying to show that the criticism of emotional response can cut both ways if one is committed to hard incompatibilism.”
I do not understand where “criticism” comes into it. We are discussing what is, not what should be. If evolution, for good or ill, has made us prone to experiencing reciprocal love, that’s just how things are. It has also made us, as individuals, prone to experiencing hatred. But as emotions that are experienced in different circumstances, including one being reciprocal and the other not, it does not follow that they will be affected similarly by conscious rejection of the concept of free will.
I confess I do not fully understand your “bracketed worry”. You appear to be focused on the appropriateness of attitudes, something I have not mentioned since free will is an issue of objective fact, not of moral opinion. Appropriateness of attitudes may well be a valid concern, but to use that concern as evidence that there must be at least some degree of free will, in order to satisfy a desire that attitudes be appropriate, is to put the cart before the horse.
“Your comments regarding anger lend support to view (sic) that emotions can and can’t be rational once they have hit the reflective stage.”
I do not know what that means.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 11, 2013
I’ll respond in the order of the issues you raised.
1. I have not espoused a compatibilist position. I have assumed hard incompatibilism for the sake of argument.
2. The question of appropriateness is quite relevant. Just because two people love each other does not entail that they are good to each other.
3.Again, I have no idea what it means for something to be “natural to our species”. Is your claim that the first members of homo sapien loved reciprocally as we do now? Also, your saying that recipricol love is impossible if the chip induced the love. But you haven’t given an argument for why. “Because it’s not natural” is not an argument.
4. Criticism is the point of this article. Hard incompatibilists claim that anger is not warranted because we lack free will. THEY criticize those who punish and hold resentment to others because such a response is based on an understanding of free will that is desert-based. I am showing how THERE argument can’t be used to undermine love as well.
5. You say we are talking about what is, but this claim suggests that you haven’t read the article thoroughly. I have granted that we don’t have free will for the sake of argument so that we can now grapple with the further claims of appropriateness.
6. I have never used the appropriateness of attitudes to argue that we have free will. Again, I have assumed that we do not have free will for the sake of argument.
7. you have said “Clearly, there are no rational grounds for such hatred, and so, given opportunity for reflection, and if rationality is not overwhelmed by emotion, the negative attitude of hatred, or at least the blame and desire for retribution underlying it, is not justified, is not just, and cannot be sustained.” I responded by saying ““Your comments regarding anger lend support to view (sic) that emotions can and can’t be rational once they have hit the reflective stage.” you then said that “you don’t know what that means”. Not sure how I can help you here. I am just using a similar argument from the one I quoted from you above to show how hard incompatibilism can also undermine loving emotions.
To be honest I think you are not reading the article for it’s own sake. I read you as trying to argue against claims made in previous posts. Just because the post discusses free will does not mean that one is arguing that we do or do not have it. I thought I was clear about the assumptions I was making in this argument see below
“Free will grounds “true hatred” according to Harris because “[such] hatred requires that we view our enemy as the ultimate author of his thoughts and actions”. To be the “ultimate author” of our actions is another way of saying that we must be free to act with respect to the act in question but also that we are free from refraining to act as such. Though I disagree that we have sufficient proof to deny such authorship, I will grant that we do not for the remainder of this post. I will also assume, for the sake of argument, that Harris is correct about hatred. It is never appropriate to hate another because the appropriateness of hatred depends on us having the free will that Harris denies. I grant these points in an effort to show an inconsistency in Harris’ view. To see this we must look briefly at some of the remarks he made regarding another moral emotion or attitude, love.”
Where is the claim that we have free will?
LikeLike
Landbeyond
October 14, 2013
Maintaining the order of numbered issues:
“1. I have not espoused a compatibilist position. I have assumed hard incompatibilism for the sake of argument.”
I know. I was referring to the first paragraph of your preceding response. Perhaps I misinterpreted your meaning therein.
“2. The question of appropriateness is quite relevant. Just because two people love each other does not entail that they are good to each other.”
The latter is true; but it introduces a new, disruptive element to the “reciprocal love” on which you seemed to be basing your argument.
“3.Again, I have no idea what it means for something to be “natural to our species”. Is your claim that the first members of homo sapien (sic) loved reciprocally as we do now? Also, your saying that recipricol (sic) love is impossible if the chip induced the love. But you haven’t given an argument for why. “Because it’s not natural” is not an argument.”
Leaving aside the idea that there ever existed any clearly defined “first members of homo sapiens”, I fail to see the relevance to what is natural to our present thought processes.
I said that true, i.e. normal, “reciprocal love” is impossible in the chip scenario, because possessing such a chip, or relating to another with such a chip, is not in our nature as human beings. That referring to how the human brain works “is not an argument” is something on which it appears we disagree.
“4. Criticism is the point of this article. Hard incompatibilists claim that anger is not warranted because we lack free will. THEY criticize those who punish and hold resentment to others because such a response is based on an understanding of free will that is desert-based. I am showing how THERE (sic) argument can’t (sic) be used to undermine love as well.”
Criticism of Harris’ argument seems to have morphed into criticism of reciprocal love absent compatibilism, rather than demonstrating its non-existence absent same.
“5. You say we are talking about what is, but this claim suggests that you haven’t read the article thoroughly. I have granted that we don’t have free will for the sake of argument so that we can now grapple with the further claims of appropriateness.”
I have read the article thoroughly: I do not accept that appropriateness is a relevant consideration. It seems to come down to personal opinion.
“6. I have never used the appropriateness of attitudes to argue that we have free will. Again, I have assumed that we do not have free will for the sake of argument.”
Except that you say:
“But, as I have argued before, these sorts of obligations (understood as “wider scope moral obligations”) themselves require the sort of free will denied by Sam Harris. If this is true then via transitivity we could argue that such relationships could not be maintained, or at best would be damaged. This is so because such obligations seem to play a necessary role in maintaining the reciprocal loving relationship.”
This seems to imply that for reciprocal love, with its necessary obligations, to be appropriate requires free will.
7. “I am just using a similar argument from the one I quoted from you above to show how hard incompatibilism can also undermine loving emotions.”
It can do so, but may not. It does not undermine the fact of their existence.
Where is the claim that we have free will?
You start with the assumption that we do not, but go on to conclude that: “At the end of the day it at least seems plausible to assume that reciprocal loving relationships implicitly assume morally responsible agency of the basic-desert variety.” Unless you deny that such relationships are possible, the implication that we have free will seems unavoidable.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 16, 2013
I will respond the points that have not been settled. Though, in the future it would be much more productive to raise a concern or two and discuss those until moving to another objection. This would make the thread much more readable. As some may find a few points interesting but not others. The format of raising 10 objections does not bode well for a fruitful dialogue.
2. The disruptive element is the element I am trying to get at.
3. Referring to how the brain works is fine in the free will debate, what is questionable is how you invoke “natural” processes as somehow more meaningful than processes created “artificially”. Both are deterministic processes (the chip and a deterministic causal chain). Why should we think the “natural” deterministic chain is relevant but the “artificial” deterministic chain is not to our discussion? I think both are important, you are arguing that there is a difference, and a difference that matters. So, I am not denying the relevance of brain processes I am denying that the chip process is different in any significant way. You have yet to argue for why the chip scenario is relevantly different. Because one is natural and one is not is not an argument in itself.
4.Harris claimed that we do not have free will and he also claimed that such a conclusion does not have ramifications for our interpersonal relationships (at least some of them). I am arguing directly against his latter claim throughout… I am not criticizing reciprocal love (in general), I am criticizing those who think we can have appropriate reciprocal loving relationships if determinism were true. Those criticisms are very different.
5. If appropriateness is not relevant then why claim, as you did, that “Clearly, there are no rational grounds for such hatred, and so, given opportunity for reflection, and if rationality is not overwhelmed by emotion, the negative attitude of hatred, or at least the blame and desire for retribution underlying it, is not justified, is not just, and cannot be sustained”?
Here by saying that blame or the negative attitude of hatred “is not justified” you seem to be suggesting that such hatred would be inappropriate. If so, then appropriateness seems quite relevant.
6. I agree that my claims imply that ” for reciprocal love, with its necessary obligations, to be appropriate requires free will”. But, this doesn’t not mean that I have argued that we do *in fact* have free will. Thus, I stand by my claim that “I have never used the appropriateness of attitudes to argue that we have free will. Again, I have assumed that we do not have free will for the sake of argument.”
7. ” Unless you deny that such relationships are possible, the implication that we have free will seems unavoidable.” I do deny that the appropriateness of the emotions that sustain such relationships can hold if determinism were true. So, I can agree that these relationships do *exist* and that we do not have free will (again, for the sake of argument). My claim is about the appropriateness of the attitudes which serve as the foundations of such relationships.
At the end of the day I am trying to show that the hard incompatibilist is being inconsistent. On the one hand they claim that moral responsibility and negative reactive attitudes are not compatible with free will because they would not be appropriate given what determinism entails, yet on the other hand they think that love, forgiveness, and deontic evaluations are compatible with determinism.
The point here is not to argue that we have free will or that we do not. Only that when you claim that we do not have it that you lose much more than you might have initially thought. To be consistent, the hard incompatibilist is forced (rationally speaking) to reconsider the relationships they have and the responses they give to moral situations.
LikeLike
Sreejith
October 15, 2013
Hi Justin,
Wonderful post; I loved it! I am not very familiar with debates on Free will. So, let me seek a clarification from you.
You said: “I will also assume, for the sake of argument, that Harris is correct about hatred. It is never appropriate to hate another because the appropriateness of hatred depends on us having the free will that Harris denies”.
If I understand it correctly, Harris is claiming the following:
1. The appropriateness of hatred depends on us having free will
2. We do not have free will
Therefore; 3. It is not appropriate for us to hate another.
But I am having some uneasiness here. If we say that we all are determined in what we do, how does the question of appropriateness arise? Premise 2 says that “we do not have free will’. That would mean that the person who did the action do not have free will and the person who felt hatred to him also do not have free will. The person who did the action is determined in doing that action. The person who felt hatred towards the person who did that particulatr action is also dtermined in feeling hatred. In such a determined scenario I tend think that the question of appropriateness of action/feeling would not even arise. To say that a particular action or a paticular feeling (hatred in this case) is appropriate or inappropriate is to presuppose free will; the possibility of not doing that action, or doing it differenlty etc. I am wondering whether Harris has any argument on it? Or did I misunderstood something?
LikeLike
Landbeyond
October 16, 2013
Welcome to the paradox of awareness of lacking free will. Your uneasiness is justified, but you are stuck with it, I fear.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 16, 2013
I do not think I am stuck with it. I believe that we are free some of the time.
Though, Harris and others (hard incompatibilists) seem stuck with disavowing central moral evaluations and the basis for our most meaningful interpersonal relationships. That seems to be quite the bullet to bite.
LikeLike
Landbeyond
October 17, 2013
I don’t recall whether you have specified at which times we are free or what distinguishes those times from others; but wonder whether you’ve considered the possibility that your concern with “central moral evaluations and the basis for our most meaningful interpersonal relationships” is prompting your belief.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 17, 2013
That concern might have something to do with it. Though, the lack of conclusive evidence that we *do not have free will* coupled with the 1st person experiences which suggest that I do have it is likely doing most of the work.
LikeLike
Justin Caouette
October 16, 2013
Thanks, Sreejith.
Yes, the argument you have recapitulated for Harris seems right.
Great question and worry, it’s the same question and worry that brought me to challenge Harris’ position.
Just because things are determined does not mean that things can or cannot be appropriate, prima facie. Just because one is determined to act, yes they must act. But, we must also consider the role that we play in the deterministic chain. So, although we may not be able to refrain from feeling a certain way initially, we do still have the power of reflection, which itself will be part of the causal chain for sustaining or rejecting our initially determined response. If part of that reflection is thinking that our initial response was unwarranted then it could follow that we we would be determined to release that initial determined anger.
I linked why Harris thinks hatred is inappropriate and why blame is also inappropriate in the initial article. He thinks that such emotions presuppose a desert-based understanding of moral responsibility, an understanding that is not warranted in a deterministic universe. I am simply showing how such an argument also undermines things we value in the world.
LikeLike
deminthon
February 14, 2014
We are physically lawful mechanisms that act in constrained ways. Let’s assume that, at least partially, among those constraints is logical coherence … in some circumstances, at least, we conform our actions to what seems logical/reasonable/rational. Then, if Harris’s writings convince some people that it is irrational to hate because of determinism, some people will, in some circumstances, refrain from hating — they will view hate as inappropriate and will act accordingly. Since Harris the mechanism is motivated to reduce hate, he is motivated to find such arguments and present them. All of this can be understood within a deterministic framework … replace the people with computers and it still holds.
LikeLike
deminthon
February 14, 2014
This illustrates yet another example of Harris’s intellectual dishonesty. I hate global warming and what it will do to human civilization, and I despise the people who are blocking action through their denial of science. Both are natural phenomena; the deniers are infested with libertarian dogma, but it could just as well be brain tumors. My feelings about AGW deniers are *very much* like my feelings about mosquitoes and hurricanes.
I also love beautiful sunsets, and I adore the artists and poets who express beautiful sentiments about these things … but they might as well have brain tumors. The same goes for people who are generous and loving, who go out of their way and self-sacrifice for the benefit of others. They have mechanistic explanations just as sunsets do, yet I have feelings for both that go beyond “objective” and these are feelings that are worth having and worth wanting to have.
Sam Harris could easily find and argue for parallels between hate and love if he weren’t motivated not to do so.
LikeLike